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CAN SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
PROVIDE A MEANS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION?
BENJAMIN J RICHARDSON*

The seemingly rapid growth of the market for socially responsible
investment (‘SRI’) in Australia and other jurisdictions promises to make
financing decisions more accountable to social and environmental
criteria. Indeed, the ability of financiers to withhold funds and thereby
hinder development, such as the decision of the Australia and New
Zealand Banking Group Ltd in 2008 to shun financing a Tasmanian
pulp mill planned by Gunns Ltd, raises hopes that financial institutions
could act as surrogate environmental regulators. The long-standing SRI
movement arose partly as an answer to the lacunae or weaknesses of
official regulation, providing a means by which ethical investors could
challenge corporations partaking in socially egregious or environmentally
irresponsible practices condoned by authorities. Yet, these aspirations
appear to have been too ambitious. Lacking sufficient market leverage,
and reliant on relatively tame voluntary codes of conduct, paradoxically
the success of the SRI movement increasingly relies on the state itself. SRI
depends on weightier public policy reforms in such areas as economic
incentives and fiduciary duties, although considerable uncertainty
persists concerning which policy reforms could most effectively advance
SRI. Concomitantly, reformers must justify why investment institutions
should be held legally accountable to a higher standard than those firms
they finance. Unless these barriers to SRI and its regulation are resolved,
it is doubtful whether SRI in Australia or elsewhere can contribute
significantly to environmental governance.

I

THE ISSUES

Can socially responsible investment (‘SRI’) provide a means of environmental
regulation, disciplining companies to adhere to higher environmental standards
as a condition of financing? It has become important to answer this question given
the seemingly rapid growth of the SRI market in Australia and other countries
in recent years, coupled with faith among some commentators and investors in
SRI’s capacity to promote sustainable development. A related pressing question
is what should be the relationship between the SRI market and regulation,
including environmental law? If a company is acting in accordance with basic

∗

Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. I am grateful for the helpful comments provided
by the anonymous reviewers on an earlier draft of this article.

Can Socially Responsible Investment Provide a Means of Environmental Regulation?

263

environmental legislation, should the legal system concern itself with investors
wishing to raise the environmental bar?
The financial sector, comprising institutional investors such as superannuation
plans, as well as retail investors who buy into mutual funds, and the banking
sector, has not traditionally been seen as relevant to environmental policy.
Today, the financial sector is attracting growing interest from environmental
organisations and policymakers in Australia, who are taking a broader and more
sophisticated view of the economic forces that shape environmental pressures.1
On the one hand, financial institutions may be viewed as the unseen polluters,
contributing to environmental problems that they fund and profit from, yet
are rarely held directly accountable for. Instead, such problems are habitually
attributed to the operations of front-line companies. On the other hand, the
SRI movement promises to catalyse the financial sector into an instrument of
progressive social and environmental change. Recent developments in Australia
have drawn attention to these dyadic roles of financial institutions.
One such development was the controversy over whether the Australia and New
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (‘ANZ’) would fund Gunns Ltd’s (‘Gunns’) new pulp
mill in Tasmania. It is worth commenting on this interesting episode. In May
2008, the ANZ decided not to support the A$1.4 billion pulp mill proposed by
Gunns, the forestry behemoth.2 Although the ANZ publicly declined to elaborate
on its reasons for shunning the project,3 it appears that it was partly concerned
about the environmental sequelae of the project, or at least the negative publicity
from conservation groups campaigning against the controversial pulp mill.4
Other financial institutions in Australia such as Perpetual Investments had also
incurred criticisms for having ties to Gunns.5 Earlier, the ANZ had commissioned
a technical review of the project, which examined the mill’s environmental
standards. As a signatory to the Equator Principles,6 an international voluntary
code of conduct for socially responsible financing, the ANZ had also promised to
observe high standards of environmental due diligence. Yet, curiously, although
1

2
3
4

5
6

See PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd, The Role of Australia’s Financial Sector in
Sustainability: A Report Prepared for Environment Australia (2001); Donald Ross and Dorothy Wood,
‘Do Environmental and Social Controls Matter to Australian Capital Investment Decision-making?’
(2008) 17 Business Strategy and the Environment 294; Nina Lansbury, Socially Responsible Climate
Change? Fossil Fuel Investments of the Socially Responsible Investment Industry in Australia (2002)
Mineral Policy Institute <http://users.nlc.net.au/mpi/rr/docs/sri_climate_change.pdf> at 15 October
2009.
Marian Wilkinson and Ben Cubby, ‘ANZ Exit from Pulp Mill Project Confirmed’, The Age (Melbourne),
28 May 2008, 3.
Fairfax Digital, ‘ANZ Quiet on Gunns Funding’, Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 22 May 2008 <http://
business.smh.com.au/business/anz-quiet-on-gunns-funding-20080522-2h52.html> at 15 October 2009.
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (‘ABC’), ‘Lobby Group Ups Pressure on ANZ’, ABC News
(Online), 7 April 2008 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/07/2209539.htm> at 15 October
2009.
ABC, ‘Perpetual Investments Chief Sprayed over Gunns Stake’, ABC News (Online), 30 October 2007
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/10/30/2076107.htm> at 15 October 2009.
See Equator Principles Financial Institutions (‘EPFI’), The ‘Equator Principles’: A Financial Industry
Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and Managing Social and Environmental Risk in Project
Financing (2006) <http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/Equator_Principles.pdf> at 15
October 2009.
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ANZ declined to finance the pulp mill, government authorities had endorsed it
so long as Gunns complied with relevant environmental and other regulatory
standards.7
This article is not an in-depth investigation of the financing of the Tasmanian
pulp mill, although more will be said about it later. Rather, it concentrates on
the issues of broader significance posed by this episode, particularly whether
banks and other financial institutions could and should play a greater role in
safeguarding the environment and promoting clean development. As mechanisms
of corporate financing, banks and other financial institutions may be strategically
placed to influence development choices and economic trends.8 As shareholders,
financiers also acquire a voice within corporate governance to leverage change.
Yet, corporate financing has been viewed in the investment community largely
as a passive relationship in which financial institutions do not need to consider
the environmental consequences of projects or companies they support. The
only significant exception is where their own financial interests are jeopardised.
They could be threatened if a borrower sinks into insolvency under the weight
of hefty pollution fines, or if a company’s share price dives because of a sullied
environmental reputation.9 Otherwise, it would appear to be wishful thinking
to hope that financiers could reliably act as surrogate regulators, using their
market leverage to improve the environmental quality of economic development.
Financiers could price themselves out of the market as clients look elsewhere for
funding from less scrupulous sources.
Financiers’ freedom of action in these respects is also constrained by investment
laws.10 Superannuation funds, investment companies and other types of financiers
owe fiduciary duties to their investors, which tend to preclude their putting
the public interest before the financial interests of their beneficiary investors.
Although there is no Australian case law on the issue,11 some British court rulings

7

8
9
10
11

On 4 October 2007 the Hon Malcolm Turnbull, Minister for the Environment and Water Resources,
approved the pulp mill under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
(Cth), subject to Gunns satisfying 48 conditions: Commonwealth of Australia, Approval Decision
– Gunns Pulp Mill (EPBC 2007/3385) (2007) Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage
and the Arts <http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/notices/assessments/2007/3385/pubs/approvaldecision.pdf> at 17 October 2009. The Tasmanian Government issued its own special permits for the
pulp mill: Australian Government, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
(EPBC Act): Fact Sheet (2008) [2] <http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/publications/pubs/epbc-actfact-sheet.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
Julie Froud, Adam Leaver and Karel Williams, ‘New Actors in a Financialised Economy and the
Remaking of Capitalism’ (2007) 12 New Political Economy 339.
See Jacqueline Lipton, ‘Project Financing and the Environment: Lender Liability for Environmental
Damage in Australia’ (1996) 11 Journal of International Banking Law 7.
See generally Benjamin J Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating the Unseen
Polluters (2008).
Academic commentators believe that Australian courts would follow English law on this point: see
Andrew Leigh, ‘“Caveat Investor”: The Ethical Investment of Superannuation in Australia’ (1997)
25 Australian Business Law Review 341, 347-8; Paul Ali and Martin Gold, An Appraisal of Socially
Responsible Investments and Implications for Trustees and Other Investment Fiduciaries (2002) [15]
<http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/research-papers/Monograph%20Series/SRI%20final%20report.pdf>
at 15 October 2009.
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such as in Cowan v Scargill,12 and other cases,13 suggest investment institutions
would be liable to their beneficiaries if they recklessly sacrifice financial returns
at the altar of ethical causes.14 While the directors of a bank do not owe similar
fiduciary duties to the bank’s depositors, they are legally accountable to the
bank and its shareholders to act financially prudently.15 Other legal obstacles
to environmentally-enlightened financing include the difficulties the system of
corporate governance poses to altruistic, Ralph Nader-style shareholder activism
from within.16 Superannuants are often in no better position to influence the
investment policy of their pension fund, being largely relegated into a passive role
by fiduciary law principles that assume only trustees can speak on their behalf.17
Also, international and domestic financial regulation contains virtually no rules
to address the environmental pressures that arise from financial markets, as the
regulatory system attributes the environmental costs of damaging activities to
the front-line companies, for regulation at an operational level through separate
environmental laws.18
Despite such obstacles, in recent decades a movement for SRI has swept
international financial markets including Australia, raising the spectre of a
more enlightened approach to financing not predicated on maximising financial
returns.19 Its proponents include pension plans promoting sustainable, longterm investment, mutual funds selling SRI portfolios to the general public, and
banks requiring their borrowers to minimise the environmental degradation of
financed projects.20 SRI came to prominence in the 1980s during the campaign
led by religious investors to divest from South Africa then under the apartheid
regime. After a lull during the 1990s, SRI has taken off again. The most recent
survey, published in November 2008 for the Responsible Investment Association
Australasia, valued Australian SRI portfolios at approximately A$15.7 billion,
representing 1.9 percent of all managed investment portfolios in the country.21
By comparison, in 2000 these SRI portfolios were only worth a paltry A$325

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20

21

[1985] 1 Ch 270.
Martin v City of Edinburgh District Council [1988] SLT 329; Harries v Church Commissioners for
England [1992] 1 WLR 1241.
See Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investments: A Case of Disjointed Thinking’ (2008) 67 Cambridge Law
Journal 396.
John Glover, ‘Banks and Fiduciary Relationships’ (1995) 7 Bond Law Review 50.
Ruth Aguilera et al, ‘Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the
UK and the US’ (2006) 14 Corporate Governance: An International Review 147.
Gregory Alexander, ‘Pensions and Passivity’ (1993) 56 Law and Contemporary Problems 111. Note,
however, that Australia’s Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) does mandate some
limited member representation on trustee boards of funds.
On financial markets regulation, see Peter Spencer, The Structure and Regulation of Financial Markets
(2002); John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000).
Russell Sparkes, Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution (2002).
See Marcel Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and the Future of the
Planet (2001); Sonia Labatt and Rodney White, Environmental Finance: A Guide to Environmental Risk
Assessment and Financial Products (2002).
Corporate Monitor, Responsible Investment 2008: A Benchmark Report on Australia and New Zealand
by the Responsible Investment Association Australasia (2008) 15.
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million.22 Public opinion surveys in Australia also suggest rising popular
sentiment in favour of more ethical investment choices.23
Concomitantly, a plethora of international SRI codes of conduct has been drafted,
often advanced by the investment community itself. These include the Equator
Principles, the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (‘UNPRI’),24
and the United Nations Environment Program’s Finance Initiative (‘UNEP FI’).25
Many Australian financiers have signed up to these codes of conduct.26 This
ensemble of quasi, ‘soft’ regulation is furnishing both normative standards and
procedures for more transparent and accountable financial decisions.27 A venerable
feature of these mechanisms is that they can apply to multi-jurisdictional contexts
and target financial institutions operating in global markets.28
This article thus seeks to resolve debates about SRI’s capacity to provide a means of
environmental regulation, and the rationale for such an approach, with particular
reference to SRI in Australia. The first half of the article examines the capacity
of SRI to leverage change in corporate environmental behaviour, and argues
that on several grounds its capacity to act as a means of governance is presently
rather limited. Most of the remaining part of the article explores the relationship
between SRI and law, and it advances an argument that investors should be
held legally accountable for environmental problems associated with corporate
financing. The concluding section sketches some ideas for legal reform of the SRI
market, highlighting the importance of institutional investors’ fiduciary duties.
Throughout the discussion, theoretical and empirical perspectives from a range
of disciplines apart from law are canvassed. The SRI market and its governance
cannot be meaningfully analysed from the narrow lens of legal doctrine alone.

22
23

24
25
26
27

28

Ibid 16.
See, eg, Mark Watmore and Leanne Bradley, The Rothschild Report: Ethical Investing, A Study
into Current Perceptions (2001). Some more recent surveys in other jurisdictions point to growing
interest in SRI: F&C Asset Management, Research Commissioned by F&C Asset Management into
the Ethical Investment Concerns of the UK Public (2006); CNW Group, ‘Canadians Weigh Social and
Environmental Factors in Investment Decisions, Investors Group Research Finds’, Canada Newswire,
6 November 2007 <http://www.cnw.ca/en/releases/archive/November2007/05/c3691.html> at 15
October 2009.
See Principles of Responsible Investment (‘PRI’) Secretariat, Principles of Responsible Investment
(2009) PRI <http://www.unpri.org/principles/> at 15 October 2009.
See United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (‘UNEP FI’), UNEP Finance Initiative
(2009) UNEP FI <http://www.unepfi.org> at 15 October 2009.
Corporate Monitor, above n 21, 20-1.
See Kate Miles, ‘Targeting Financiers: Can Voluntary Codes of Conduct for the Investment and
Financing Sectors Achieve Environmental and Sustainability Objectives?’ in Nathalie Chalifour et al
(eds), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International and Comparative Perspectives Volume
V (2008) 947; Oren Perez, ‘The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-regulation to Multi-polar
Governance’ in Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg and Gerd Winter (eds), Responsible Business: Selfgovernance and Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (2008) 151.
Robert Falkner, ‘Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links’
(2003) 3 Global Environmental Politics 72.
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SRI AS A MEANS OF GOVERNANCE?
A

Introduction

The recent ascendancy of SRI has occurred largely without official imprimatur,
yet, as will be argued, its future growth and effectiveness is likely to depend
on regulatory intervention from the state. The argument in this section of the
paper focuses on three critical problems with the SRI market, which cast serious
doubts on its ability to provide an effective means of controlling the social and
environmental behaviour of financial markets. First, for various reasons, the SRI
movement has increasingly shunned ethical arguments in favour of a business
case for responsible financing. It promises to make investors prosperous, rather
than merely virtuous. By making social and environmental activism conditional
on furthering the ‘bottom line’, SRI has blunted its critical strength because, inter
alia, there often remains a countervailing business case for financing socially
irresponsible activities. Second, as corporate finance theory predicts, the SRI
market generally lacks the ability to influence the cost of capital of firms, and
thereby give green companies a tangible market advantage over polluting rivals.
Even the shift to business case motivations has failed to transform significantly
SRI’s stunted leverage. Third, the efforts of the SRI movement to develop its own
codes of conduct, such as the Equator Principles or the UNPRI, have resulted in
relatively facile standards that fall well short of moving the financial community
beyond business-as-usual.

B

SRI’s Morph from the Ethical to the Business Case

SRI’s philosophical motivations have altered dramatically in the last decade
without commensurately enhancing its capacity to leverage improved corporate
behaviour. Having evolved from its traditions of religious-based, limited-issue
activism, which began with the Quakers in the 18th century, the modern era of SRI
arose in the late 1960s in the wake of opposition to corporate ties to the Vietnam
War29 and South Africa’s apartheid regime.30 SRI now spans a broad constellation
of financial actors campaigning on a potpourri of social and environmental
causes.31 It champions issues as diverse as animal welfare, aboriginal rights and
mitigating climate change. While there is no authoritative agreement in the market
on what qualifies as ‘SRI’, it has become widely recognised as primarily a means
to further environmentally sustainable development, or ‘sustainability’, as the
concept is often known.32 Yet, as with the contested sustainability discourse, the
29
30
31
32

Michele Micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action
(2003) 104-5.
Malek Lashgari and David Gant, ‘Social Investing: The Sullivan Principles’ (1989) 47 Review of Social
Economy 74.
Russell Sparkes, ‘A Historical Perspective on the Growth of Socially Responsible Investment’ in
Rodney Sullivan and Craig Mackenzie (eds), Responsible Investment (2006) 39.
For an early perspective, see Susan Meeker-Lowry, Economics as if the Earth Really Mattered: A
Catalyst Guide to Socially Conscious Investing (1988).
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motivations to incorporate environmental considerations in investment decisions
are diverse. The dominant motivation in SRI has become a business case, on the
assumption that SRI can give investors a financial advantage. This stance has
come at the expense of a greatly diminished, ethically-based boutique sector.
Let us look at the latter style of SRI first, as historically SRI was typically
understood nobly as ‘ethical investment’. While ethical approaches to investment
were mainly based on deontological ethics (focusing on the rightness or
wrongness of an act), presently they are commonly associated with teleological
ethics (focusing on the consequences of a particular action).33 An example of the
former approach is investors not wishing to profit from ‘sinful’ activities, such
as gambling or pornography. Conversely, the latter style of ethical investment
is promoted to leverage change in the environmental or social behaviour of
companies. It does not ignore the ‘bottom line’, yet expects consideration of
ethical issues for their own sake, and not only for financial benefit. It presumes
that an individual or organisation remains moral when faced with any decision,
including a financial one.34
Ethical investment is commonly associated with religious institutions.35 They
exploited their financial resources to campaign against the former apartheid
regime in South Africa. This divestment campaign was motivated not by a desire
to reap a financial advantage, but because morally it was perceived as the just
course of action. Today, some faith-based investors continue to champion the
moral high-ground, such as the United States-based Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility’s campaigns on climate change and environmental justice.36
Outside of the religious sector, ethically-motivated investors are sometimes found
among community-based credit unions (for example, Canada’s Vancouver City
Savings Credit Union), in the banking sector (for example, the Cooperative Bank,
in the United Kingdom)37 and some investment companies that screen rigorously
on ethical criteria (for example, the Australian Ethical Investment Ltd).38
Ethical considerations evidently do not weigh greatly on the SRI calculations of
institutional investors. Institutions that invest on behalf of thousands of investors
would likely dismiss calls that they should choose investments on ethical
grounds, contending that, as their fund members likely hold diverse ethical
views on social and environmental issues, it would be impossible to achieve a

33

34
35
36
37
38

Neil Carter and Megan Huby, ‘Ecological Citizenship and Ethical Investment’ (2005) 14 Environmental
Politics 255; Paul Dembinski et al, ‘The Ethical Foundations of Responsible Investment’ (2003) 48
Journal of Business Ethics 203.
Wesley Cragg, ‘Business Ethics and Stakeholder Theory’ (2002) 12 Business Ethics Quarterly 113.
Paola Triolo, Martin Palmer and Steve Waygood, A Capital Solution: Faith, Finance and Concern for a
Living Planet (2000) 26-53.
See Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Working Groups: Global Warming: Goals &
Objectives (2004) <http://www.iccr.org/issues/globalwarm/goalsobjectives.php> at 15 October 2009.
See The Co-operative Bank, The Co-operative Bank (2009) <http://www.co-operativebank.co.uk> at 15
October 2009; UmweltBank, UmweltBank (2009) <http://www.umweltbank.de> at 15 October 2009.
See Australian Ethical Investment Ltd, Rigorous Ethical Screening (2009) <http://www.australianethical.
com.au/our-approach> at 15 October 2009.
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consensus of values to guide financial decision-making.39 This stance seemingly
relegates ethics to a subjective, personal taste, compared with the supposed hard
objectivity of financial returns. Alternatively, the maximisation of financial
returns is considered by investment institutions as a clear and easily measurable
benchmark to which they should be held accountable.40 The dominant style of
contemporary SRI is thus driven by a business case, which scrutinises the social,
environmental and corporate governance issues not because they are viewed
as intrinsically significant, but primarily because they can affect the financial
condition of companies. In business parlance, such factors garner attention when
considered to be financially ‘material’, involving additional financial risks or
investment opportunities.41
Evidence of this changing SRI discourse is readily found. Symbolically, in
2007 Australia’s peak SRI industry association changed its name from the
‘Ethical Investment Association’ to the ‘Responsible Investment Association
Australasia’.42 The connotation is that ‘responsible investment’ is a more neutral
term without the political and moral connotations of ‘ethical’ investment. The
influential UNEP FI, which is an industry partnership coordinated by the United
Nations to promote SRI, downplays ethical arguments. In its report, Show Me the
Money, UNEP FI explains that ‘[t]he first – and arguably for investors the most
important – reason to integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to make more money’.43
Another UNEP FI report cautions investment analysts to ‘[c]ommunicate on
issue-specific, proven, quantifiable, material links to business value; [and to]
avoid moral arguments’.44 In contrast to the assertive divestment campaigns and
confrontational shareholder activism of earlier forms of SRI, business case SRI
is typically implemented through light-touch screens filtering only the most
pernicious companies from an investment portfolio, polite engagement with
corporate management, and more sophisticated financial evaluations of the risks
and profitable opportunities inhering in corporate social and environmental
behaviour. Aggressive shareholder advocacy and strict ethical screens are tactics
rarely found among mainstream ‘responsible’ investors.
At first glance, then, by seeking to conceptualise environmental and social issues
in the market’s own logic, business case SRI promisingly provides a solution to
the movement’s historical marginalisation. Thus, environmental issues such as
biodiversity conservation and climate change may come to resonate with greater

39
40
41
42

43
44

Interview with staff, Responsible Investment Association Australasia, 11 December 2005.
See Luc Renneboog, Jenke Ter Horst and Chendi Zhang, ‘Socially Responsible Investments: Institutional
Aspects, Performance, and Investor Behavior’ (2008) 32 Journal of Banking and Finance 1723.
UNEP FI, The Materiality of Social, Environmental and Corporate Governance Issues in Equity Pricing
(2004).
See Responsible Investment Association Australasia (‘RIAA’), About RIAA (2009) <http://www.
responsibleinvestment.org/html/s02_article/article_view.asp?id=462&nav_cat_id=233&nav_top_
id=89> at 15 October 2009.
UNEP FI, Show Me the Money: Linking Environmental, Social and Governance Issues to Company
Value, Report (2006) 4.
UNEP FI, Generation Lost: Young Financial Analysts and Environmental, Social and Governance
Issues: Executive Summary (2004) 5.
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significance in investment decision-making as issues with material financial
consequences.
However, for several reasons, the business case is not a complete answer to
the barriers to SRI; indeed, if there was a clear business case for investing
responsibly, why would we ever need corrective environmental regulation, let
alone a movement for SRI? A primary blind spot with business case SRI is that,
unless social and environmental issues are perceived to have tangible financial
implications, investors may ignore them. Often they are perceived as too nebulous
for workable financial quantification.45 Values such as biodiversity or climate
integrity cannot be captured by conventional financial accounting systems unless
they give rise to specific expenses, income or financial risks attributable to an
individual organisation.46 Sometimes ‘reputational risks’ associated with unethical
practices may be of sufficient consequence to financiers to motivate action.47 Yet,
reputational risk to financiers is not an echo for all underlying societal concerns,
as sometimes the most disadvantaged groups and victims of environmental
hardship lack the means to publicise their plight. The second ingrained problem
is that often there remains a countervailing business case for environmental
pillage. For example, despite the SRI industry’s rhetoric about climate change
risks, the fossil fuel industry has hardly changed. The continuing investment
in Canada’s oil sands is one controversial example.48 The profit to be made by
exploiting Australia’s old-growth forests is another.49 Without an additional layer
of ethical responsibility, financiers may lack the incentive to take actions beyond
those prescribed by an orthodox business case. The third limitation is that, while
the SRI community increasingly argues that there is a ‘long-term’ business case
for investing responsibly on such issues as climate change, the problem is that
market pressures to act for the short-term readily trump any perceived long-term
costs and benefits that are discounted considerably. For example, the incentive
system for fund managers greatly hinders their willingness to move their focus
beyond short-term performance and market valuations.50
Beyond the perverse incentives individual financiers face to investing responsibly,
collective action problems also hinder SRI. The financial market overall contains
no mechanism to scale the economy within ecosystem-based limits, such as by

45

46
47

48
49
50

Susan McGeachie, Michael Kiernan and Eric Kirzner, Finance and the Environment in North America:
The State of Play of the Integration of Environmental Issues into Financial Research: Executive
Summary (2005) 57.
Susannah Goodman and Tim Little, The Gap in GAAP: An Examination of Environmental Accounting
Loopholes (2003).
Somewhere between 50-70 percent of large companies’ economic value is reportedly intangible, tied up
in their brand name and goodwill: Noel Purcell, ‘The Other ROI – The Responsibility of Investment’
(Speech delivered at the UNEP FI Global Roundtable, Melbourne, 24-25 October 2007).
Kirk Makin, ‘High-stakes Battle Looms over Oil-sands Pollution’, The Globe Mail (Canada), 15 August
2007, A1.
Robert Gale, ‘Old Growth Logging: Does It Matter if Environmental Protection Costs Jobs? (2005) 1
International Journal of Environment, Workplace and Employment 203.
Carmen Juravle and Alan Lewis, ‘Identifying Impediments to SI in Europe: A Review of the Practitioner
and Academic Literature’ (2008) 17 Business Ethics: A European Review 285, 290.
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restraining pollution within the assimilative capacity of the environment.51 In the
absence of regulatory restraints, such as a legislative cap on an economy’s carbon
emissions, environmentally-conscious investment institutions face steep hurdles
to working collectively to moderate economic growth imperatives. Further,
because such institutions commonly act through intermediaries such as fund
managers, who are hired on limited-term contracts with frequent performance
evaluations, even the most enlightened fund geared to sustainable, long-term
investment can readily succumb to myopic financing practices.52
Given these and other limitations, as the following section will show, neither
business nor ethical compulsions have so far proved adequate to allow SRI to
dominate the market.

C

SRI’s Muted Market Leverage

Despite some contrary rhetorical claims in the academic and popular press,53 SRI
remains largely a boutique, niche sector. Precisely quantifying the SRI market
is not easy, because existing surveys use inconsistent methodologies, indicative
of the underlying lack of an objective basis to defining SRI. Research in North
America and Western Europe by the leading SRI industry groups suggests that
SRI probably accounts for below 10 percent of the investment markets in these
regions.54 Much research appears to exaggerate the extent of SRI; for instance,
the US surveys treat as ‘SRI’ any fund that ethically screens merely against one
activity, such as tobacco stocks, while counting its entire investment portfolio,
which otherwise resembles any regular fund.55 International research on the
banking sector also indicates cause for concern, with one 2006 study concluding
that ‘with few exceptions bank policies are lagging significantly behind relevant
international standards and best practices’.56
Likewise, while the SRI market in Australia has apparently blossomed in recent
years, it remains small in absolute terms. According to the most recent survey, as
previously noted, the ‘core’ assets of retail and institutional SRI as at 30 June 2008
amounted to only about A$15.7 billion.57 Taking into account the additional value
of financiers’ corporate engagement to promote social and environmental issues,
51
52
53
54
55
56

57

Herman Daly, ‘Allocation, Distribution and Scale: Towards an Economics That Is Efficient, Just and
Sustainable’ (1992) 6 Ecological Economics 185.
See Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (2nd ed, 2005).
See, eg, Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2010: The Rise of Conscious Capitalism (2005) 140; Tavia
Grant, ‘Social Investment Assets Soar’, The Globe and Mail (Canada), 22 March 2007, B17.
Social Investment Forum (‘SIF’), 2007 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United
States (2008); Eurosif, Socially Responsible Investment among European Institutional Investors (2006).
SIF, 2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States: A 10-year Review
(2006) 9.
Worldwide Fund for Nature and BankTrack, Shaping the Future of Sustainable Finance: Moving from
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and improved financial analysis of social and environmental considerations, the
‘broad’ SRI market in Australia was estimated by that survey to be about A$58
billion.58 By market share, these figures amount to somewhere between 2 and 5
percent of the Australian financial economy.59
Such a market, even if doubled or tripled to allow generously for any miscalculations,
is vastly insufficient to enable SRI to influence significantly the behaviour of
companies. Yet, proponents of SRI contend that it financially rewards ethical firms
by additional investment, while punishing unethical firms through divestment and
thereby higher costs of raising capital.60 Presumably, affected firms would then
be motivated to reform their policies, making them more attractive to SRI-driven
financiers. These effects are also related to social investors’ desire, as discussed
shortly, to benefit financially from their ‘ethical’ investments.61
Modern corporate finance theory doubts that SRI can change corporate conduct
while benefiting investors financially.62 Modern portfolio theory holds that a
diversified investment universe is more likely to produce optimal, risk-adjusted
returns than a narrowly constructed portfolio.63 Exclusionary ethical screens that
reduce the investment universe should increase risks and thereby ultimately hurt
returns.64 Even if markets in the real world do not necessarily behave as theory
predicts, as some commentators plausibly contend,65 SRI may not necessarily
enjoy an advantage because an inefficient market may under- or over-rate both
ethical and unethical businesses equally.66 While much empirical research
suggests that risk-adjusted returns for SRI portfolios do not generally underperform the market,67 there may be a simple explanation. As Haigh and Hazelton
explain: ‘The reason for correlations between the performance of conventional
and SRI funds may be that the portfolios of SRI funds are not markedly different
to those of conventional mutual funds’.68 In other words, SRI is likely to be too
inclusive, screening out a lone tobacco producer, but otherwise investing as usual.
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A second fundamental problem with SRI is its present limited ability to influence
the cost of capital. Finance theory implies that social investors are price takers,
not price makers. Certainly, corporations’ need to raise funds is a crucial variable,
as ‘SRI is more likely to be relevant whenever companies are heavily dependent
on the stock market as a financing instrument’.69 Corporate financing data suggest
that most companies, especially well-established firms, are able to self-finance
their operations and some growth through operational revenue rather than by
borrowing or issuing bonds or new stock.70 However, even mature companies are
not entirely insulated from the demands of investors.71 They have reasons to be
mindful of their stock price even when not issuing new stock to raise capital. For
instance, a declining stock price can affect a firm’s market capitalisation and thus
stock market listing. Also, corporate managements’ remuneration is often tied
to stock options, giving management incentives to adopt measures to keep stock
prices high.
Conventional finance theory suggests that investors can trade any quantity of
a firm’s shares without affecting its price.72 Supposedly this is because in an
efficient equity market, where demand for a company’s stock is almost perfectly
elastic,73 the price of a stock simply reflects the expected future cash flows, and all
informed investors value the company’s stock at the same price.74 As shareholder
divestment by SRI funds does not change the expected cash flow from the firm’s
activities, its stock prices therefore should not yield.75 Only if potential traders
believe the sale or purchase of stock reflects a downward or upward view of the
company’s underlying financial prospects would the stock price vary significantly.
Business case SRI that educates the market to the financial consequences of
firms’ environmental behaviour may have such an effect. It is when SRI views
unethical behaviour differently from the market as a whole that it may not
influence economic fundamentals, and thus corporate behaviour.
Other theoretical research that takes a more granular perspective of capital markets,
and does not assume that markets always behave according to textbook theory,
predicts that SRI can alter the cost of capital when the stock is risky, unique, or is
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traded in small, restrictive markets.76 Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner have developed
a theoretical model of corporate environmental responsibility, which predicts that
SRI investors will need to hold at least 20 percent of the market in order to lower
the cost of capital sufficiently to induce a business to invest in environmental
improvements.77 Other researchers suggest a much higher market share, although
even 20 percent greatly exceeds the size of the SRI market presently.78
The foregoing discussion, relating to equity investors, is not necessarily applicable
to debt financing such as the situation involving the ANZ and Gunns. Banks can
exert relatively more influence over borrowers, especially small enterprises that
have fewer financing options, as well as firms seeking large project financing
loans.79 Gunns, for example, sought nearly A$1.5 billion for its Tasmanian pulp
mill, more than the market capitalisation value of the forestry company.80 Selfinterested risk mitigation principally motivates lenders to follow environmental
due diligence in scrutinising prospective borrowers. Lenders may adjust the cost
of a loan to reflect any residual environmental risks, requiring the borrower to
adopt specific environmental safeguards, or demanding more valuable security
relative to the value of the loan.81 But in a competitive credit market, lenders
also have incentives not to raise the bar too high for risk of losing clients to less
scrupulous lenders.
Hard evidence regarding the impact of SRI in the equity and debt financing
markets generally does not support the claim that SRI leverages change. The
most comprehensive studied action is the South African boycott, and much
research suggests that the divestment campaign has had limited effect on the
economic performance of targeted companies.82 The significant divestment from
the tobacco industry in the wake of a spate of litigation against tobacco fi rms also
appears to have had a muted effect on their stock prices.83 Other research that
has investigated changes to the cost of capital in light of new market information
about firms’ environmental behaviour, such as news of an environmental scandal,
pollution fines or, conversely, commendations for environmental achievements,
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suggests such factors could affect stock prices or the cost of borrowing.84 However,
the market impact tends to be short-lived.85
Research on shareholder advocacy, a seminal means of SRI, provides another
way to map the impact of SRI. Social investors sometimes choose to influence
laggards by dialogue and exerting pressure from within, rather than by divestment.
Institutional investors are widely known as passive investors, lacking knowledge
and incentives to monitor companies because of the costs involved and difficulties
of coordinating action.86 Where they do engage with companies out of social or
environmental concerns, as some commentators believe they increasingly do,87
their impact appears episodic and fleeting. Shareholder advocacy is predominantly
a North American tradition, and is not widely practised among Australian social
investors. The 2008 survey of the Australian SRI market noted forlornly that
‘for the last 3 years, and again in 2008, there have been no specific shareholder
resolutions that related to an issue of environmental or social responsibility’.88
Shareholder activism initiated by environmental groups in Australia arose in the
late 1990s.89 One early example occurred in September 1999 when the Wilderness
Society Inc (‘WSI’) sought to hinder Wesfarmers’ logging of old-growth forests
in Western Australia. Purchasing a small batch of shares in the company, the
WSI then led a coalition of disaffected shareholders in petitioning the board of
Wesfarmers to hold an extraordinary general meeting to consider a shareholder
resolution. Yet, as has typically happened to such SRI-driven resolutions in
Australia, 98 percent of the Wesfarmers shareholders voted against the WSI’s
proposal that asked the company to conduct more rigorous environmental
assessments of its logging operations.90 Nonetheless, the WSI has continued
to harness shareholder pressure as one of its campaign tactics, including as a
means of challenging Gunns’s proposed pulp mill in Tasmania. Attempting to
influence the ANZ Bank when it was contemplating finance for the project, the
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WSI issued an ‘Open Letter to ANZ Shareholders’ calling for an extraordinary
general meeting to discuss actions to address the environmental issues at stake.91
Although SRI-inspired shareholder resolutions rarely garner more than 10
percent of votes cast,92 sometimes defeated shareholder resolutions may induce
management to work cooperatively, as they may interpret even modest dissenting
votes as reflective of broader unease about company policies and decisions. Apart
from formal resolutions, investors may favour informal corporate engagement to
influence management, although its extent and impact by its very nature is much
harder to gauge.
Overall, SRI is yet to transform financial markets and the companies they
finance. Certainly, more capital now flows into self-proclaimed SRI funds than
has occurred historically. Some investors are becoming more active shareholders,
and markets increasingly heed corporate environmental performance when it is
perceived as financially salient. SRI has generally not yet had the strength of
a surrogate regulator, able to impose on companies a separate market licence
to operate. Indeed, business case-driven SRI appears to rely on the underlying
system of environmental regulation to alter the financial advantages between
polluters and socially responsible firms.
Because the SRI market is likely to be much smaller than industry surveys
suggest, its capacity to engineer change by raising the cost of finance for polluters
or pressuring for change through shareholder activism, has been limited.
Regulatory and public policy changes are therefore probably essential to improve
the quality and extent of SRI. However, the SRI movement itself has not greatly
clamoured for such reforms, preferring instead to draft its own codes of conduct
for financiers to adopt voluntarily. The following discussion will concentrate on
one of these codes, the Equator Principles.

D
1

Market-based SRI Standards and Codes

Overview

Contemporary SRI is more than just a label to describe certain financial
transactions that are socially or environmentally sensitive. The SRI sector has also
fashioned its own codes of conduct and standards to help coordinate, standardise
and facilitate responsible financing. These voluntary mechanisms developed by
market and civil society institutions, which have proliferated greatly since 2000,
are attracting considerable interest in the financial community.93
This web of SRI governance spans a diversity of methods, structures and
objectives, which we can broadly categorise into four types, although any
91
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individual mechanism may contain elements of each type. First, there are
normative frameworks that enunciate substantive principles and guidance on
desirable performance. They include the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial
Institutions94 and the UNPRI.95 Process standards enabling the assessment,
verification and communication of performance constitute another form of
governance. These include the Equator Principles96 and the Global Reporting
Initiative.97 They do not dictate social and environmental outcomes, but rather
establish processes, such as environmental reporting standards, that may
be conducive to improving performance. Third, management systems, such
as the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 14001 regime,98
provide frameworks for organisations to manage routinely their environmental
and social impacts. For example, a management system could create a process
for an organisation to improve an aspect of its operations, such as its energy
consumption, and thereby to reduce its environmental footprint. The fourth
and final key modality of governance is comparative evaluation mechanisms,
whereby external entities evaluate and rank corporate sustainability performance
for the SRI industry. These rating mechanisms include SRI stock market indexes
such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes99 and the London Stock Exchange’s
FTSE4Good Index Series.100
The main advantages of the new SRI codes would appear to be their ability to
create a framework for coordinated action on common concerns, to provide a
forum for exchange of information and best practices, and to build a network for
peer pressure to minimise unscrupulous and unethical financing. These effects
are quite possible given that some of the codes have been well subscribed to: the
UNPRI, for example, boasted at least 360 signatories managing approximately
US$14 trillion as of mid-2008.101 Sixty-five of the UNPRI signatories at this
date were Australian financial institutions.102 The most successful voluntary
codes have been those that set standards for corporate social and environmental
disclosures, which help social investors to differentiate companies’ sustainability
performance. One such code is the Carbon Disclosure Project (‘CDP’), a
mechanism that coordinates requests from institutional investors for information
94
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on companies’ climate change-related activities such as their greenhouse gas
emissions.103 By mid-2009, over 5000 corporations worldwide have been asked to
report to the CDP, on behalf of nearly 400 investment institutions.104
Many commentators and policymakers remain sceptical of corporate intentions,
and doubt that voluntary mechanisms can provide a credible means of
environmental or social regulation.105 An extensive literature has theorised the
drift to corporate self-regulation and the motivations behind the proliferation
of various corporate codes of conduct, which does not need to be duplicated
here.106 Many of these SRI codes appear too ambiguous and open-ended in their
expectations. They lack substantive standards on social justice or ecological
integrity. The most demanding SRI standards are contained in the Collevecchio
Declaration on Financial Institutions, drafted by civil society institutions, which
has been largely ignored by mainstream investment institutions.
They favour more discretionary and procedure-based standards, dealing
with disclosure, reporting, and auditing of investment activities. While these
transparency measures have some beneficial effects, they appear unlikely to
induce major changes in investors’ underlying goals. Information on pollution
or human rights violations must compete for attention in a crowded field with
often seemingly more pressing and tangible concerns. Voluntary mechanisms
also typically lack credible sanctions or enforcement codes, whereby compliance
has come to depend on peer pressure, the discipline of the market or sustained
pressure from NGOs (non-governmental organisations). The corporate stonewalling of the more stringent draft United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights107 poignantly illustrates the attitudes of some businesses to
regulatory standards with teeth.108

2

The Equator Principles

The Equator Principles (‘Principles’) will be examined here to illustrate the nature
and implementation of one of these SRI codes. Furthermore, as the ANZ Bank
is a signatory to the Principles it is worth considering how they are applied in
103 See Carbon Disclosure Project (‘CDP’), Carbon Disclosure Project: Home (2009) CDP <http://www.
cdproject.net> at 15 October 2009.
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relation to a specific environmental controversy. The Principles provide lenders
with a framework to manage the social and environmental impacts associated
with projects, such as dams, factories and mines, which the lenders finance.109
Formulated mainly by the banking industry under the auspices of the World
Bank’s International Finance Corporation (‘IFC’), the Principles target private,
commercial lending, especially in developing countries and emerging economies
where competent environmental regulation may be lacking. Motivated to evade
both public criticism of their support of controversial projects and the loss of
business to less scrupulous lenders, a cohort of banks has sought to level the
playing field for responsible project financing by drafting the Principles.110 The
credibility of the Principles is boosted by involving the IFC, the World Bank’s
private-sector lending arm.
The Principles are not entirely self-contained standards, but incorporate references
to the IFC’s Safeguard Policies for Social and Environmental Impact Assessment
(‘SEIA’), forestry, dam safety, indigenous peoples and other topics. The Principles
were released in June 2003111 and revised in July 2006.112 All signatories pledge
to provide loans only to borrowers who conform to the Principles. The Principles
apply to projects with a total capital cost of at least US$10 million (US$50 million
before the 2006 revisions).113 They require lenders to rate projects that they plan to
finance based on the magnitude of potential impacts and risks in accordance with
the screening criteria of the IFC.114 These criteria categorise projects as A, B, or C
(high, medium, and low respectively), depending on their potential environmental
and social impacts. A or B project borrowers must undertake a SEIA based on
IFC standards to address the issues identified in the screening process. Projectfinancing banks must also prepare an Action Plan based on the conclusions of the
SEIA.115 For category C projects, no further assessment is required beyond the
initial screening.
Lenders of category A and B projects must also ensure that the borrower has
consulted with affected local communities ‘in a structured and culturally
appropriate manner’.116 This requirement falls short of the ‘prior informed consent’
standard demanded by indigenous peoples and other vulnerable communities,
as reflected in some international legal instruments.117 However, the Principles
apply higher transparency and accountability standards than some other SRI
109 Timothy O’Riordan, ‘Converting the Equator Principles to Equator Stewardship’ (2005) 47(4)
Environment 1.
110 Natasha Affolder, ‘Cachet Not Cash: Another Sort of World Bank Group Borrowing’ (2006) 14
Michigan State Journal of International Law 141, 156.
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112 See Elisa Morgera, ‘Significant Trends in Corporate Environmental Accountability: The New
Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation’ (2007) 18 Colorado Journal of
International Environmental Law and Policy 151.
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114 Ibid 2 [1].
115 Ibid 3 [4].
116 Ibid [5].
117 Claire Charters, ‘Indigenous Peoples and International Law and Policy’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review
22.
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codes such as the UNPRI. For example, proponents must make the SEIA report
and Action Plan available in a local language for public comment, and these
documents are subject to independent expert review.118 Project financing must
also include a ‘grievance mechanism’ to hear complaints ‘by individuals or groups
from among project-affected communities’.119 Finally, prior to drawing on the
loan, the borrower must covenant with the lender to implement an environmental
management plan and to provide ongoing monitoring of any impacts.120
Given the banking sector’s hand in the design of the Principles, its embracement
of them is unsurprising. As of April 2009, nearly 70 banks and related financial
institutions, accounting for over 85 percent of the global project financing market,
have signed the Principles.121 The signatories include three Australian banks –
Westpac, the National Australia Bank and ANZ. However, the Commonwealth
Bank of Australia (‘CBA’), the largest bank in Australia, has not signed the
Principles yet.122 A study by the British law firm, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer,
concluded that the Principles ‘impact on the financial market generally and their
success in redefining banking considerations has been far greater than anyone
could have predicted’.123 Through common standards and procedures for earlier
and more granular risk assessment, the Principles have helped signatory banks
to minimise the reputational risks associated with development projects that pose
significant social and environmental disruption. Subscription to the Principles
offers public relations benefits to deflect NGOs’ incessant scrutiny of lenders.124
The 2006 revisions to the Principles have improved their accountability,
transparency, and enforceability, although weaknesses remain.125 A lender’s
categorisation of a project or the scope of an SEIA or management plan cannot
readily be challenged. The categorisation of a project is crucial, for it influences the
types of environmental standards and procedures that would subsequently apply.
Further, while affected groups may publicly comment on a SEIA or a proposed
management plan, they cannot legally challenge its adequacy. Moreover, the very
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formulation of the Principles tends to be vague, making it hard to hold financiers
to account on other standards.
Implementation of the Principles has received mixed reviews. BankTrack, an
umbrella organisation of NGOs pooling their advocacy on financial issues, has
found various lapses.126 Conversely, a report by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
suggests, more optimistically, that the Principles have led some Equator banks
‘into more structured dialogue with stakeholders and NGOs about social and
environmental aspects of their lending’.127 Several international project financing
deals have tested the credibility of the Principles. These include the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline project, to bring Caspian Sea oil to Western Europe,128 the
Sakhalin II oil and gas project in Eastern Russia,129 and the Uruguayan pulp mills
bordering Uruguay and Argentina.130 The latter project, financed by Calyon and
other lenders, has been particularly controversial, leading to litigation between
these states in the International Court of Justice.131

3

Financing the Gunns Pulp Mill and the Equator Principles

The financing of Gunns’s forestry project in northern Tasmania has also put the
spotlight on the Equator Principles in an Australian context. According to Gunns,
the A$1.4 billion project represents ‘the largest-ever investment by the private
sector in Tasmania and the largest-ever investment within the forestry sector in
Australia’.132 Gunns also describes it as the ‘world’s greenest pulp mill’, utilising
international best practice environmental technologies and procedures.133 Various
environmental organisations and community groups dispute these assertions,
fearful in particular of intensification of clear-cutting of Tasmania’s old-growth
forests and dioxin emissions from the mill itself.134 Nonetheless, the prospect of
increased investment, jobs and other economic benefits has contributed to both
the Tasmanian and Commonwealth governments approving the project in 2007.135
Suits brought by the WSI and Investors for the Future of Tasmania against
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and Gas Project’ (2007) 51 Canadian Geographer 255.
130 Machted Spek, Financing Pulp Mills: An Appraisal of Risk Assessment and Safeguard Procedures
(2006) 57.
131 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Provisional Measures) [2006] ICJ Rep 135.
132 Gunns Ltd, Bell Bay Pulp Mill: Frequently Asked Questions (2005) <http://www.gunnspulpmill.com.
au/faqs.php> at 15 October 2009.
133 Gunns Ltd, Bell Bay Pulp Mill (2005) <http://www.gunnspulpmill.com.au> at 15 October 2009.
134 See, eg, BankTrack, Gunns Pulp Mill Proposal – Tasmania (2008) <http://www.banktrack.org/show/
dodgydeals/gunns_pulp_mill_proposal_tasmania> at 15 October 2009; Tasmanians Against the Pulp
Mill Inc, ‘Reports and Submissions on the Proposed Pulp Mill’, <http://tapvision.info/node/31> at 15
October 2009; Richard Flanagan, ‘Out of Control: The Tragedy of Tasmania’s Forests’ (2007) 23 The
Monthly 20.
135 ABC News, Govt Gives Green Light to Pulp Mill (2007) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/
stories/2007/10/04/2050653.htm> at 15 October 2009. The approval is subject to Gunns Ltd meeting
various environmental and other conditions.
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the federal government, claiming that successive Ministers acted unlawfully
according to the principles of judicial review by allowing the environmental
assessment of the pulp mill to be fast-tracked, have been dismissed by the Federal
Court.136
Apart from the official imprimatur given to the project, the ANZ’s decision to
shun Gunns’s project was all the more surprising given that it had been a longstanding financial backer of the company. ANZ was expected to be the lead
financier in a lending syndicate for the pulp mill. However, after conducting its
own independent review of the proposal and following public outcry against the
project, ANZ chose to discontinue its involvement with Gunns. ANZ issued a
curt public statement, explaining that ‘[d]ue to client confidentiality, we are not in
a position to comment further on this decision’.137
The bank’s desire to avoid tainting its reputation by association with an
environmentally controversial project almost certainly contributed to its stance.
BankTrack had earlier written to ANZ regarding what it saw as the failure of
the environmental assessment procedure to fulfill standards required by the
Principles.138 In regard to the Principles, which the ANZ had adopted in December
2006, it declared:
By adopting the Equator Principles, ANZ has voluntarily committed to
fund only new projects that can be developed and operated according
to sound social and environmental standards. The Principles are now
considered global best practice for ensuring applicable project finance
proposals meet these standards.139
The ANZ has several other policies relevant to corporate social responsibility,
including an Environment Charter140 and a Forest Policy.141 The latter includes a
promise to ‘require an environmental and social impact assessment’ of forestry
proposals, but ANZ states that it may finance projects that bring environmental
harm if ‘the socio-economic benefits can been [sic] demonstrated’.142
The lack of disclosure by the ANZ regarding how it has evaluated the Gunns
project does not meet the Principles it pledges to follow. The ANZ explains in its
official policy that:

136 Wilderness Society Inc v Turnbull (2007) 66 FCR 154; The Investors for the Future of Tasmania Inc v
Minister for Environment and Water Resources (2007) 98 ALD 659; Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister
for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2009] FCA 330 (Unreported, Tracey J, 9 April 2009).
137 ANZ, ANZ and Gunns Limited’s Proposed Bell Bay Pulp Mill (2008) <http://www.anz.com/aus/AboutANZ/Corporate-Responsibility/pdf/ANZGunns.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
138 BankTrack, above n 134.
139 ANZ, Equator Principles (2009) ANZ <http://www.anz.com/aus/values/environment/Equator.asp> at
15 October 2009.
140 ANZ, ANZ Environment Charter (2005) <http://www.anz.com/aus/about/Environment/pdf/
Environment8pp_52394.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
141 ANZ, ANZ Social and Environmental Management Policy and Guideline for Forests (2008) <http://
www.anz.com/resources/b/5/b5666e004f22083d912fb36edaf3a73e/Forests-Biodiversity.pdf?CACHEI
D=6be2d2804f1d3ef4a5a6b558b54e5b8d> at 15 October 2009.
142 Ibid 3.
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We will report on the progress of our implementation of the Equator
Principles, including numbers of transactions screened and how these
transactions were categorised according to social and environmental
impact, through our annual and interim Corporate Responsibility Reports
and regular stakeholder communications.143
Neither the ANZ’s Corporate Responsibility Interim Report, released in mid2008,144 nor its most recent reports on its implementation of the Principles, sheds
any light on how it has evaluated the Gunns project.145 Information is provided
only in aggregate, summary form, which hardly allows for public scrutiny of the
rigour of the bank’s assessments. That said, as the ANZ is declining rather than
supporting the pulp mill, in this instance the lack of disclosure is not detrimental
from an environmental perspective.
While the ANZ’s action alone did not halt the pulp mill, it certainly caused
some inconvenience and cost to Gunns; the latter had to search for new financial
backers,146 which became much more difficult in the worsening global financial
recession of 2008. To make the costs of managing the project more manageable, in
2009 Gunns was seeking a joint venture with another company.147 The availability
of less scrupulous sources of finance or support (albeit perhaps on inferior terms)
for environmentally problematic projects therefore could undermine the ability of
ethical financiers to promote SRI.
The activities of Chinese banks in project financing in other contexts, for example,
are already rousing environmental concern.148 The seriousness of this situation is
reflected in the former President of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, publicly
criticising Chinese banks for not following the World Bank’s example in adhering
to environmental and human rights standards when lending to infrastructure
projects in Africa.149 A global financial market that allows firms to raise funds
offshore has important implications for governing the SRI market.

143 ANZ, Equator Principles, above n 139.
144 ANZ, Corporate Responsibility Interim Report (2008) <http://www.anz.com/aus/About-ANZ/
Corporate-Responsibility/pdf/ForestsBiodiversity.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
145 ANZ, Equator Principles Half Year Report – March 2008 (2008) <http://www.anz.com/about-us/
corporate-responsibility/customers/responsible-business-lending/equator-principles/historicalresults/> at 15 October 2009; ANZ, Equator Principles Full Year Report – December 2006 – September
2007 (2007) <http://www.anz.com/about-us/corporate-responsibility/customers/responsible-businesslending/equator-principles/historical-results/> at 15 October 2009.
146 Nick Clark, ‘Gunns Reloads in Cash Hunt’, The Mercury (Hobart), 30 May 2008.
147 Matthew Denholm, ‘Gunns Close to Deal with Tassie Pulp Mill Partner’, The Australian (Sydney), 16
April 2009, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25340259-5006788,00.html> at 16
October 2009.
148 Michelle Chan-Fishel, Time to Go Green: Environmental Responsibility in the Chinese Banking Sector
(2007).
149 Editorial, ‘Mr Wolfowitz and the Bank’, New York Times (New York), 2 January 2007, <http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/01/02/opinion/02tue1.html> at 16 October 2009.
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E
1

SRI Regulation

Holding Financial Institutions to Account

Given the limitations of the SRI market and its own codes of conduct, public
regulation will surely be necessary if the financial sector is to become an agent
for sustainable development. Once presented as an alternative to governmental
regulation, the SRI movement is already starting to concede the necessity of state
intervention, such as reforms to corporate governance to facilitate shareholder
activism, and corporate environmental reporting to enable investors to
differentiate firms more readily on environmental performance.150 The financial
sector’s dependence on public policymaking is most acutely evident in the area of
climate finance, which requires carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes imposed
by governments to help price the cost of greenhouse gas emissions.151
Before examining how states are regulating the financial sector to promote SRI, it
is necessary to explain why the financial sector should be accountable for the social
and environmental problems associated with companies and projects it funds.
The following argument has two inter-related components. First, it addresses
the question of why financial institutions should be required by policymakers
to be mindful of the environmental impacts of activities they finance. Second,
it considers why financiers should sometimes be held accountable to a higher
standard than the firms they fund. Why, for instance, should we expect the ANZ
to forego financing a pulp mill that would comply with official regulation?
Admittedly, if we had ‘perfect’ environmental regulation of the front-line
companies, such as Gunns, there would presumably be no need to worry about
the decisions of their financiers because all environmental costs and benefits
would be accounted for. The cost of capital would fully reflect environmental
performance, with polluters incurring higher operational costs, and therefore
competitive disadvantages in raising finance. In such a scenario, SRI would revert
to its traditional role of deontological ethical investment, whereby individuals
could choose to shun investment in activities they found personally morally
objectionable, such as alcohol or gambling.
Such perfect regulation at the corporate operational level is rare. Some four
decades of environmental law-making in the modern era has mitigated but has
hardly ended humankind’s unsustainable path.152 Even countries with relatively
advanced environmental law systems are challenged by the growing volume of
cross-border investments in jurisdictions with much less rigorous legal standards.
150 Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating the Unseen Polluters, above n 10,
303-75.
151 See Sonia Labatt and Rodney White, Carbon Finance: The Financial Implications of Climate Change
(2007); Benjamin J Richardson, ‘Climate Finance and Its Governance: Moving to a Low Carbon
Economy through Socially Responsible Financing?’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 597.
152 Millennium Environmental Assessment, Living beyond Our Means: Natural Assets and Human Wellbeing (Statement from the Board) (2005) <http://www.wri.org/publication/millennium-ecosystemassessment-living-beyond-our-means-natural-assets-and-human-we> at 15 October 2009.
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In the context of global finance, where investors in one jurisdiction can profit
from economic activities in another, it is imperative to have environmental law
standards that target ‘wholesale’ decisions concerning future development,
and thus environmental pressures, that arise. Those decisions are made in the
financial sector. Bringing financial institutions to account could relieve pressure
on conventional environmental laws by decreasing initiation of polluting
developments. Ideally, such developments would never receive finance, or would
have to be redesigned to meet sustainable development benchmarks in order to
secure affordable finance.
A second reason to target financiers directly is because their strategic economic
position can be exploited to enable obstacles to market regulation identified
by systems theory to be reduced. Systems theory challenges the teleological
interpretation of modern regulation, questioning claims that we can solve
society’s complex and numerous environmental dilemmas through planned
social intervention.153 Modern society is described as polycentric and acephalous:
an assemblage of autonomous systems that have evolved in response to diverse
functional needs. The systems include: the law, the market, the political system,
and so on. There are no universal norms or supreme institutions that control the
relationship between these systems. The various social systems are conceived
as ‘autopoietic’ by Luhmann – each has developed its own operational codes,
protocols, and other means of communication, and therefore can respond only to
problems defined by its own terms.154 Thus, the legal subsystem communicates
through rights, duties, and rules, whereas the lingua franca of the market is based
on the norms of money, exchange, competition, and profitability. Consequently,
a regulatory prescription to the corporate sector to protect biological diversity,
for instance, will presumably be interpreted and evaluated primarily from a
cost-benefit perspective congruent with market imperatives. This conception of
social systems has led ‘reflexive law’ theorists such as Teubner to argue for a less
ambitious role for the legal system, which jettisons complex command-and-control
regulation from the ‘outside’ in favour of market-compatible policy instruments
and mechanisms to encourage business self-regulation from ‘within’.155
The financial sector, while part of the market system, also occupies a strategic
boundary position between different systems. For example, lenders are crucial for
implementing governments’ monetary policy on interest rates, and authorities’
money laundering controls work more effectively when banks are obliged
to report suspicious transactions.156 Financiers can also be vehicles for ‘legal’

153 See Niklas Luhmann, Ecological Communication (John Bednarz trans, 1989 ed) [trans of Ökologische
Kommunikation: Kann die moderne Gesellschaft sich auf ökologische Gefährdungen einstellen?];
Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (1984).
154 Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (John Bednarz Jr and Dirk Baecker trans, 1995 ed) 13, 147 [trans of
Soziale Systeme]; Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Anne Bankowska and Ruth Adler
trans, 1993 ed) [trans of Recht als Autopoietisches System].
155 Gunther Teubner, ‘The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective Attribution in Ecological Liability’
(1994) 16 Cardozo Law Review 429.
156 Alastair Brown, ‘Money Laundering: A European and UK Perspective’ (1997) 12 Journal of
International Banking Law 307.
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communication, transmitting information about correct corporate environmental
behaviour, such as where a lender’s own financial interests are at stake due to
a borrower’s risk of incurring liability for pollution costs. Jessop suggests that
organisations straddling the boundaries of different social systems are potentially
well placed to ‘enhance mutual understanding’ and ‘play a role in linking subsystems’.157 By holding strategic, intermediate positions between the state and
corporate sector, financial organisations could be harnessed as a means of
environmental regulation, such as through requirements to promote SRI.158 Thus,
to the extent that direct environmental regulation of the market is hindered,
policymakers might be able to exploit the financial institutions that increasingly
dominate the economy.
A third reason to target the financial sector, and even hold it accountable to higher
standards than that applicable to the companies it funds, is the generally greater
economic and environmental significance of financial institutions. The 2008
sub-prime mortgage lending crisis in the US illustrates painfully how failings
in one financial sector can ripple through the international economy producing
much more devastating impacts.159 Thus, apart from any environmental effects
attributable to the financial economy, many commentators have long argued
on traditional economic policy grounds that banks and other financiers should
be controlled and monitored by regulators more closely.160 The financial sector
contains propagation mechanisms that can amplify initial, small shocks throughout
the economy; insolvency of a bank usually has far greater ramifications for the
economy than the collapse of a non-financial company.161
A related fourth argument builds on the so-called ‘universal owner thesis’
advanced by Hawley and Williams. They herald institutional investors, such
as large pension funds, as a new force for corporate responsibility.162 Hawley
and Williams contend that these universal owners, investing broadly across
the economy, are self-interested in the health and long-term sustainability of
the entire economy. This is because, as economy-wide investors, they ‘have
no interest in abetting behavior by any one company that yields a short-term
boost while threatening harm to the economic system as a whole’.163 Acting as a
universal investor implies that what is an ‘externality’ at the level of an individual
company can result in a costly ‘internality’ for an investor’s global portfolio.
In practice, however, there is much evidence that institutional investors do not
invest responsibly; reliant on fund managers hired on limited-term contracts,
157 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place (1990) 329.
158 Benjamin J Richardson, Environmental Regulation through Financial Organisations (2002).
159 R Christopher Whalen, ‘The Subprime Crisis: Cause, Effect and Consequences’ (Policy Brief No 2008PB-04, Networks Financial Institute, 2008); George Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets:
The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means (2008).
160 Dirk Heremans, Corporate Governance Issues for Banks. A Financial Stability Perspective (2006);
Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara, ‘The Corporate Governance of Banks’ (2003) 9(1) Economic
Policy Review 91.
161 Some non-financial corporations of course are extremely economically significant, and their collapse
would produce wide-ranging economic effects. The motor vehicle industry is an example.
162 James Hawley and Andrew Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism (2000).
163 Davis, Lukomnik and Pitt-Watson, above n 87, 18.
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their investment strategies are often short-term and speculative.164 As they
commonly hold assets on behalf of millions of investors, such as pension plan
members, whose investment portfolios are closely tied to the overall health of
the economy, these universal investors should be required to take a long-term,
holistic perspective of their investments including taking account of any social or
ecological impacts that could hurt financial returns.
Finally, and perhaps ultimately, the most basic reason for targeting financiers
is simply that, in deriving profits from funding companies engaged in
environmentally degrading and socially harmful activities, they can also be
considered accountable. These unseen polluters should be unveiled for their
contribution to unsustainable development. Capital financing is instrumental to
development choices; those who enable, and benefit from, those choices through
financial investment must also share in the responsibility. Financial institutions
have evolved to mobilise capital and to facilitate financial returns for investors.
Anyone who has ever inquired at a bank about a personal loan, credit card or
mortgage, will understand that financial institutions do not want their capital idly
sitting around. To quote a well-known aphorism: ‘money does not grow on trees’.
Rather, money has to be actively managed and reinvested to generate profit. This
pervasive drive to put capital to use, to make more capital, invariably creates a
process that fuels widespread social and environmental changes. It also creates a
reason to hold financiers legally accountable.

2

SRI Regulatory Reforms for Sustainability

Legal reforms to promote SRI in Australia and other countries have quickened
since 2000, although generally they have mostly just tinkered with the operation
of financial markets. The measures range from regulating substantive investment
criteria to, more commonly, regulating procedures that shape investment
decision-making processes. Several interwoven factors have influenced these
regulatory trends and preferences. Many Western countries including Australia
are experiencing a realignment of the roles of the state and the market. The
regulatory state has tended to morph towards a system of regulatory governance
that concedes greater responsibilities and roles for market actors and, to a lesser
extent, civil society institutions.165 Legal commentators have conceptualised
some of these changes in terms of ‘mutual regulation’,166 ‘responsive regulation’,167
‘smart regulation’,168 and ‘post-regulatory governance’.169 Paradoxically, however,
164 Craig Mackenzie, ‘The Scope for Investor Action on Corporate Social and Environmental Impacts’ in
Sullivan and Mackenzie (eds), above n 31, 20, 32-3, 37.
165 See generally Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal
Philosophy 1.
166 See Peter Simmons and Brian Wynne, State, Market and Mutual Regulation? Socioeconomic Dimensions
of the Environmental Regulation of Business (1994).
167 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992).
168 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998).
169 Colin Scott, ‘Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State’, in Jacint
Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for
the Age of Governance (2004) 145.
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there has also been some countervailing expansion of states’ legal capacity to
correct market abuses and unresolved impacts.170 The recent turmoil in global
financial markets, which has exposed the hazards of some of these regulatory
shifts, has generated further debate about the possible need to return to more
stringent forms of command regulation of this sector.171
So far, SRI policy reforms have emphasised market-based and informational
tools that alter the procedures and processes of SRI decision-making. These
standards do not require additional policy consensus concerning definitions of
‘ethical’ or ‘socially responsible’. Instead, they shape the way investments are
selected and implemented, providing for greater transparency and accountability.
By attempting to modify how financiers view the environmental and social
repercussions of their actions, process standards may stimulate changes in
social values that contribute to sustainability.172 Reflexive law theorists contend
that encouraging companies to reflect and learn about their social impacts may
sometimes exert greater long-term influence than regulating firms through
coercion or rewards.173
Among these policy instruments are requirements for investment institutions to
disclose their policies for SRI and for exercising their shareholder proxy votes.
The most prominent transparency reforms have been introduced in the United
Kingdom, several other European states and Australia, obliging occupational
pension funds to disclose their SRI policies, if any.174 In 2001, the Commonwealth
legislated for superannuation funds, mutual funds, and investment life insurance
providers to disclose publicly their SRI policies (but the regulation does not oblige
these funds to practise SRI).175 Also, an amendment to federal superannuation
legislation in 2005176 has given fund contributors the right to choose where their
monies are invested, thereby enabling socially conscious investors to switch
to one of the burgeoning green and ethical funds. Another reform, adopted in
Canada and the US, requires mutual funds to disclose their shareholding proxy
voting policies and voting records.177 Its purpose is to discourage fund managers
from passively colluding with corporate management, and through a more active
170 John Cioffi, ‘Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance
Capitalism in the United States and Germany’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 533.
171 See, eg, International Monetary Fund, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of Financial
Institutions and Markets and for Liquidity Management (2009).
172 David Case, ‘Changing Corporate Behavior through Environmental Management Systems’ (2006) 31
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 7.
173 See Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer and Declan Murphy (eds), Environmental Law and Ecological
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-regulation (1994).
174 See, eg, Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005 (UK) cl 2(3)(b)(vi)-(3)(c);
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1013D(1)(l); France’s Projet de Loi sur L’Épargne Salariale n° 2001152 (19 February 2001) arts 21, 23.
175 Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), as incorporated into the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 1013D(1). The regulation however does not require these funds to have an SRI policy, only to disclose
any policy adopted.
176 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2005 (Cth).
177 Securities Exchange Commission, Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by
Registered Management Investment Companies (2003); Canadian Securities Administrators, National
Instrument 81-106 Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure and Companion Policy 81-106CP (2005).
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proxy process to improve the quality of corporate governance. Research on
implementation of some of these standards reveals shortcomings.178 Mandated
disclosures often entail vague, boilerplate statements that do not illuminate the
methodology behind SRI decisions or their implementation.179 Process standards
have rarely extended to democratising investment policymaking, which remains
dominated by fund managers, investment analysts and other experts.180 Modern
corporate and investment regulation has long been premised on investors playing
the role of ‘passive capital’ which ‘declines participation in, or is excluded from,
management of the business’.181
Mandatory SRI standards are rare. Some governments have banned specific
undesirable investments, as an adjunct to primary controls. Belgium, for
example, prohibits investments in companies that produce or distribute cluster
bombs.182 Another example is the bans instituted by some US states on pension
fund investments in Sudan, presently associated with extensive human rights
atrocities.183 Obligations to actively promote SRI appear confined to public
pension funds, with reforms adopted in France, New Zealand, Norway and
Sweden. New Zealand’s Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001
requires the guardians of the national superannuation fund to invest in such a way
as to avoid ‘prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of
the world community’,184 and to publish a statement of investment standards and
procedures that ‘must cover … ethical investment, including policies, standards,
or procedures for avoiding prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible
member of the world community’.185 The open-ended, discretionary nature of
this standard however has contributed to its perfunctory implementation.186 The
Swedish and Norwegian funds, on the other hand, are each guided by an ethics
council, which uses internationally recognised standards for human rights and
sustainable development as their benchmarks.187
Economic incentives to alter the cost-benefit calculations of financiers in favour of
sustainable development choices have also been introduced in some jurisdictions.

178 Chris Gribben and Adam Faruk, Will UK Pension Funds Become More Responsible? A Survey of
Trustees – 2004 (2004); Fair Pensions, UK Pension Scheme Transparency on Social, Environmental
and Ethical Issues (2006).
179 Michael Schwartz, ‘The “Ethics” of Ethical Investing’ (2003) 43 Journal of Business Ethics 195, 199200.
180 John Brogle, The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism (2005) 178-9; Alexander, above n 17.
181 Robert Flannigan, ‘The Political Imposture of Passive Capital’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law
Studies 139, 140.
182 Netwerk Vlaanderen VZW, ‘Belgium Bans Investments in Cluster Munitions’ (Press release, 2 March
2007) <http://www.netwerkvlaanderen.be/en/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=87&limit=6&
limitstart=18> at 15 October 2009.
183 Lucien Dhooge, ‘Condemning Khartoum: The Illinois Divestment Act and Foreign Relations’ (2006) 43
American Business Law Journal 245.
184 Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 (Cth) s 58(2)(c).
185 Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 (Cth) s 61(d).
186 Russel Norman, Betting the Bank on the Bomb (2007).
187 See generally UNEP FI and UK Social Investment Forum, Responsible Investment in Focus: How
Leading Public Pension Funds Are Meeting the Challenge (2007) 7.
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The leading example is the Netherlands’ Green Project Directive,188 which –
several studies suggest – has massively augmented the Dutch SRI market.189
The scheme provides taxation deductions for investments in environmentally
approved projects, such as wind farms and organic farms. Conversely, economic
incentives can work to discourage the financing of environmentally unsound
projects. Imposing liability on lenders for pollution problems connected to their
borrowers has been upheld by courts in the US under the ‘Superfund’ legislation;
its drastic effects in dampening bank lending to the chemical industry contributed
to modification of the scheme in 1996 to limit lenders’ liability.190
Overall, however, these first generation SRI governance reforms have yet
to engineer systemic changes to global financial markets to ensure that
environmentally sustainable development is prioritised. Isolated success stories
mask a more prevalent business-as-usual. Most SRI regulation was designed to
avoid imposing burdensome regulatory costs on financial markets. Indeed, the
financial industry has actively sought to thwart radical reforms. For instance,
in 1996 the US banking industry successfully lobbied Congress to amend the
‘Superfund’ legislation to obtain a safe harbour from lender liability suits for
cleanup costs of contaminated lands.191 Also, the mutual fund industry in North
America fiercely resisted regulations to make them disclose how they vote as
shareholders.192 In the United Kingdom and Australia, the pension fund sectors
initially opposed or doubted proposed legislation to make them disclose publicly
their policies on ethical investment.193 These vignettes generally reveal what
really motivates many financial institutions – an unencumbered market to be able
to achieve the highest returns for their investors. More fundamental potential
reforms, such as to the underlying fiduciary duties of investment institutions,
remain unaddressed.194 The tension between encouraging financiers to be mindful
of the public interest while requiring them to promote the private economic
interests of their beneficiaries has not been satisfactorily addressed.

188 The scheme was revamped and extended in 2002 and 2005: Netherlands Government, Regeling
Groenprojecten Buitenland 2002, Staatscourant, 2 January 2002, n° 1, 31; Netherlands Government,
Regeling Groenprojecten 2005, Staatscourant, 11 July 2005, n° 131, 13.
189 Vereniging van Beleggers voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling, Socially Responsible Savings and Investments
in the Netherlands: Developments in Volume and Growth of Socially-responsible Savings and Investments
in Retail Funds (2005) 11; SenterNovem, Sustainable Profit: An Overview of the Environmental Benefits
Generated by the Green Funds Scheme (2002) [6] <http://www.senternovem.nl/mmfiles/sustainable_
profit_tcm24-196677.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
190 Michael Greenberg and David Shaw, ‘To Lend or Not to Lend – That Should Not Be the Question:
The Uncertainties of Lender Liability under CERCLA’ (1992) 41 Duke Law Journal 1211; on the
1996 statutory amendments, see Olaf de Senerpont Domis, ‘New Law Finally Limits Environmental
Liability’ (1996) 161(189) American Banker 3.
191 Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-208,
110 Stat 3009.
192 Davis, Lukomnik and Pitt-Watson, above n 87, 73.
193 D Smith, ‘Pension Funds to Adopt Ethical Investment Policy’, The Times, 25 June 2000, B2; Association
of Superannuation Funds of Australia (‘ASFA’), Development of ASFA Policy on ‘Ethical Investment’
(2000) <http://www.superannuationnews.com/articles/news-2000-10-31_005.htm> at 15 October 2009.
194 See Benjamin J Richardson, ‘Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical
Investment’ (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 243.
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The dominant response of the SRI movement to this tension has been to recast
SRI into a business case, whereby social and environmental issues are defined not
as ethical imperatives, but rather as financial risks and opportunities that prudent
fiduciaries should observe. Of course, that environmental care and business
success can be compatible is not an objectionable proposition, in principle.
Financiers should benefit from companies that reduce their ecological footprint.
However, the exuberance behind this synergy has become for some financiers an
excuse to just tinker with unsustainable modes of development. Fundamentally,
business case SRI is patently no assurance to safeguarding the planet, given
that the market cannot valuate many social and environmental qualities, but
discounts the future and the countervailing short-term business case to profit
from unsustainable practices.195

III

CONCLUSIONS: FUTURE REFORMS

For the foreseeable future, however we may interpret the ANZ’s seemingly
benevolent stance to protect Tasmania’s forests from a giant pulp mill, any claims
that an SRI revolution in Australia or elsewhere is underway are unsubstantiated.196
It is probably an aberration. The institutional and economic barriers to the SRI
market remain entrenched and the core legal standards to which financiers are
held to account remain unaltered. So, what could policymakers do to make SRI
more widespread in Australian or international financial markets? While the
answer requires another article of much longer length, some basic strategies can
be outlined briefly.
First, the fiduciary duties of institutional investors should be reformed to ensure
that the public costs of private investment are accounted for. Fiduciary duties,
which govern how financial decision-makers manage the assets of beneficiary
investors, hardly license ethical investment for sustainable development. The core
duties of loyalty and prudence understandably encourage investment policies that
prioritise the maximisation of financial returns for beneficiaries to the exclusion of
collateral impacts and the interests of other stakeholders.197 The World Economic
Forum has thus recommended that authorities ‘[m]odify pension fiduciary
rules which discourage or prohibit explicit trustee consideration of social and
environmental aspects of corporate performance’.198 A study on capital markets
undertaken by Stratos Inc for Canada’s National Round Table on the Environment
and the Economy concluded: ‘current interpretations of the fiduciary duties of
pension fund managers might unnecessarily constrain their ability to address
195 For these and other problems with markets, see John McMurtry, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism (1998);
Herman Daly, Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development (1996); AnnMari Jansson et
al (eds), Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological Economics Approach to Sustainability (1994).
196 See Oliver Wagg, Project Finance – Equator Principles Case Study: ANZ Shot in Foot by Blasting
Gunns (2008) Ethical Corporation <http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=5997&rss=ecmain.xml> at 15 October 2009.
197 Thornton, above n 14.
198 World Economic Forum, Mainstreaming Responsible Investment (2005) 10.
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the full range of relevant corporate responsibility considerations related to
prospective investments’.199 Conversely, reports commissioned by UNEP FI in
2005 and 2009 have suggested that SRI is not precluded or overly hampered by
fiduciary duties.200 However, these studies defined SRI in terms of the prevailing
business case approach, which understandably can be reconciled with fiduciary
duties given that it considers social and environmental issues only to the extent
that they are financially ‘material’.
Knowing that fiduciary duties hinder SRI is relatively straightforward – the
most difficult task is to redefine intelligently fiduciary standards in a way that
can promote sustainable development while holding financial decision-makers
measurably accountable. Fiduciary duties for sustainable investment may be
redefined along a spectrum of ever-increasing exactitude. At the most liberal end
of the spectrum, fiduciary duties could merely explicitly authorise fiduciaries to
consider those social and environmental factors which they view as financially
material. Arguably, this business case approach is already allowable – indeed
essential if environmental risks jeopardise short-term returns. Some jurisdictions
have already tinkered with reforms in this direction. For instance, Connecticut
legislation provides that controllers of the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds may consider the environmental and social implications of investments,
but it does not stipulate on what grounds they should do so.201 The Canadian
province of Manitoba provides a further example. In 1995, Manitoba’s Trustee
Act was amended to permit trustees to consider non-financial criteria in their
investment policies, so long as ‘the trustee exercises the judgment and care that a
person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would exercise in administering
the property of others’.202 The limitation of a discretionary fiduciary standard
is that it does not oblige consideration of social or environmental impacts. Nor
does it allow affected third parties to enforce their interests. There is a difference
between taking the interests of various parties into account and owing a duty to
those parties.
The preference among law-makers and market actors to frame fiduciary
responsibility concerning environmental issues purely in terms of financial
‘risks’ can be seen in relation to the broader trend of risk-based regulation that
has emerged in many countries in recent years.203 Such regulatory approaches
incorporate cost-benefit analysis and other techniques that seek to make decisions
199 Stratos Inc, Corporate Disclosure and Capital Markets: Demand and Supply of Financially Relevant
Corporate Responsibility Information (2004) [12] <http://www.stratos-sts.com/publications/Corporatedisclosure-eng.pdf> at 16 October 2009.
200 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental,
Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment (2005) UNEP FI <http://www.unepfi.org/
fileadmin/documents/freshfield_legal_resp/20051123.pdf> at 15 October 2009; Asset Management
Working Group of the UNEP FI, Fiduciary Responsibility: Legal and Practical Aspects of Integrating
Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment, Report (2009) UNEP FI
<http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciaryII.pdf> at 16 October 2009.
201 Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, CONN GEN STAT para 3-13d(a) (2002).
202 The Trustee Amendment Act, SM 1995, c 14, s 79.1.
203 Julia Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk Based Regulation and the New Public Management in the UK’
[2005] Public Law 512.
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more ‘objective’ and defensible, to reduce uncertainties, and to contribute to
efficient and effective use of regulatory resources.204 In the financial sector, risk
management is the primary lens through which regulators seek to supervise
investment and other financial decisions.205 By framing ‘risk’ in ways that expose
or obscure certain issues, impacts and interests, the architects of such risk-based
governance regimes seek to contrive limits to their own responsibility and therefore
their own accountability. Consequently, risk-based regulation serves ‘to define
what are acceptable “failures” and what are not, and thus to define the parameters
of blame’.206 For SRI, a system of fiduciary finance in which responsibility is
conceived narrowly in terms of financial risks is no assurance of sustainable
development. It would serve to limit drastically the public accountability of
investment institutions given that so much environmental harm or benefit is not
captured by such economic metrics. Hopefully, the spate of worldwide scandals
in the financial sector in 2008 and 2009 that has shorn risk-based regulation in
this sector of some of its allure207 may open possibilities for other approaches to
governing investment decision-making.
Among alternative approaches, fiduciaries could be obliged by legislation to
act for sustainable development or a similar general performance standard. The
difficulty would be to design a performance standard with sufficient clarity
to make fiduciaries accountable. Vaguely worded stipulations for financial
institutions to ‘promote sustainability’ would surely not suffice. They would be
vulnerable to being usurped by discretionary interpretations to which financiers
could not be held accountable. One solution could be to utilise the considerable
advances in designing sustainable performance indicators in other fields.208 One
such indicator is the carbon footprint of an investment portfolio – one of the most
potent indicators of environmental performance.209 The SRI industry already
makes extensive use of sustainability performance standards in evaluating and
comparing potential investments – the challenge would be to extend such standards
to the financial industry itself.210 Under a reformed standard, fiduciary investors
could remain legally accountable to only their fund members or shareholders, but
they could only maximise financial returns so long as they respect sustainability
204 See Michelle Everson and Ellen Vos (eds), Uncertain Risks Regulated (2009); Henry Rothstein et al,
‘The Risks of Risk-based Regulation: Insights from the Environmental Policy Domain’ (2006) 32
Environment International 1056.
205 Marieke de Goede, ‘Repoliticising Financial Risk’ (2004) 33 Economy and Society 197, 213.
206 Julia Black, ‘Managing Regulatory Risks and Defining the Parameters of Blame: The Case of the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’ (2006) 28 Law and Policy 1.
207 See Joanna Gray, ‘Is It Time to Highlight the Limits of Risk-based Financial Regulation?’ (2009) 4
Capital Markets Law Journal 50.
208 Justin Keeble, Sophie Topiol and Simon Berkeley, ‘Using Indicators to Measure Sustainability
Performance at a Corporate and Project Level’ (2003) 44 Journal of Business Ethics 149; Oliver SchmidSchönbein and Arthur Braunschweig, EPI-Finance 2000: Environmental Performance Indicators for
the Financial Industry, Report (2000) <http://www.iwoe.unisg.ch/org/iwo/web.nsf/SysWebRessources/
EPI_finance_English.pdf/$FILE/EPI_finance_English.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
209 Trucost, Carbon Counts 2007: The Carbon Footprint Ranking of UK Investment (2007).
210 See Henry Schäfer et al, Who Is Who in Corporate Social Responsibility Rating? A Survey of
Internationally Established Rating Systems That Measure Corporate Responsibility (2006); Stephen
Fowler and Chris Hope, ‘A Critical Review of Sustainable Business Indices and Their Impact’ (2007)
76 Journal of Business Ethics 243.
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criteria. Yet, because what is ‘sustainable’ is often a very context-specific
judgment, with reference to a certain time and place, this approach is not without
limitations for some environmental criteria. A less prescriptive approach would
be to expect financiers to adhere to a general ‘reasonableness’ standard, which
could be embellished with prophylactic rules such as a requirement to conduct
an environmental impact study or consult with affected third parties if local
environmental laws are inadequate to ensure sustainable development.
Apart from fiduciary duties, reform is needed to address the global scale of
financial markets. Parallel sustainability standards must be etched into the
international legal rules governing cross-border finance. The existing range of
voluntary international standards such as the UNPRI or Equator Principles fall
short of meeting the exacting standards required. International financial market
regulation also currently ignores the social and environmental dimensions of
capital markets – indeed, the recent global financial woes illustrate the lack of
effective international regulation on even some of the most elementary financial
management issues.211
New international rules would presumably have several advantages. For one,
they would minimise a race to the bottom, as level standards would dissuade
capital from fleeing to the most regulatorily benign markets.212 Further, some
institutional investors in global markets may even welcome some standardisation
of SRI norms, as having to contend with different rules in different markets
increases compliance costs. Of course, the corporate hostility to the proposed
United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights also illustrates
the likely political obstacles to such reforms.213 On the other hand, the current
global financial crisis provides a rare opportunity to forge a new Bretton Woodstype scale of reforms that could include standards conducive to SRI, such as
mandatory disclosures of social and environmental risks, reforms to financial
accounting to incorporate social accounting metrics, and even standards for
democratising investment fund governance to widen the range of stakeholder
voices in investment decisions. Regulatory theorists such as Julia Black have
nonetheless cautioned that transnational governance regimes face acute challenges
in achieving adequate accountability and legitimacy to enable them to govern
effectively.214 These problems tend to be greatest for non-state transnational
governance mechanisms such as the Equator Principles, for which ‘[t]here is no
one organization which is responsible for issuing the principles, interpreting or
revising them’.215 Rather, the Equator banks are effectively policing themselves,
which threatens the credibility and integrity of the Principles. Mechanisms that
211 See generally Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale and John Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial
Systems: The International Regulation of Systemic Risk (2006).
212 Daniel Esty and Damien Geradin, ‘Environmental Protection and International Competitiveness’ (1998)
32(3) Journal of World Trade 5.
213 Norms, above n 107.
214 Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability of Polycentric Regulatory
Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 137.
215 Ibid 142.
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can enable other actors to coordinate public consultation and reporting, and to
ensure redress, are thus among the strategies that can boost the accountability
and thus legitimacy of international reforms to promote SRI.
These and other conceivable reforms may seem far-fetched, but with a looming
planetary environmental crisis, more radical and bitter alternatives may one day
be contemplated if we do not bring the financial sector into the environmental
debate now. These are not challenges unique to Australia or any other country,
although in each jurisdiction there will be context-specific legal and policy
challenges to governing SRI. Until then, SRI will likely remain a small, niche
sector of the financial economy, unable to greatly influence the environmental
practices of companies.

